We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert eort in a task that is exclusively benecial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's prots with the workers alleviates their eort distortion. JEL classication: C91, J50, L14, M52
Introduction
The possibility that managers and bureaucrats buy the cooperation and the loyalty of their subordinates at the expense of the organization characterizes many hierarchical organizations (Edwards, 1979) . Employees who are promoted or hired based on their loyalty towards their supervisors, and not on their merit, are more likely to invest their time and attention to maintaining good relations with their boss, rather than improving their job performance (Pearce et al., 2000) . Tirole (1986) highlights how, in a three-tier principalsupervisor-agent model, collusion between the supervisor and the agent can be sustained by a norm of reciprocity. Laont (1988 Laont ( , 1990 generalizes the notion of moral hazard to include hidden gaming, dened as the \ability that some players may have to design and play games with other members of the hierarchy by which they benet from others while they are not observable by the principal" (Laont, 1990, p.302) .
In this paper, we provide the rst experimental evidence that reciprocity sustains hidden gaming in hierarchical organizations. First, we show the emergence of backscratching between members at the lowest and at the intermediate level of a three-tier organization, at the expense of the principal. Agents, who select workers for a job on behalf of the principal, are more likely to hire candidates with lower ability. These candidates feel less entitled for the position and thus they are more prone to devote their eort in favor of the agent who selected them. Second, we design a compensation scheme which, without increasing the cost of the principal, limits the detrimental eect of backscratching reciprocity. In our experiment, we render a three-tier organization formed by one principal, one agent, and one worker. The worker has to be chosen from a pool of two candidates who dier in their ability. 1 The principal, in contrast to the agent, is not able to distinguish the candidates' ability and, therefore, delegates the hiring decision to the latter. Once employed, the worker receives a xed wage and chooses a level of non-veriable eort that can be exerted both in project X, which is benecial for the principal and the agent, and in activity Y , that provides a private benet solely to the agent. The joint payo of the principal and the agent is maximized when all the eort of the worker is devoted to project X; however, the agent's payo is maximized when the worker's eort is exerted in activity Y . Candidates dier in their abilities: for each level of eort exerted in project X the high ability candidate is more productive than the low ability one. When exerting eort in activity Y , the two candidates are equally productive. While it is public information that candidates have dierent abilities, only the agent is able to distinguish among them and this is precisely the reason why she is hired by the principal. Our aim is to capture a situation where the agent can exploit her position in order to induce subordinates to do certain activities that go beyond their formal job descriptions but give to her a personal benet. 2 In the Baseline treatment, the principal privately gives instructions to the agent about which candidate to hire: either the high or the low ability one. The agent selects one candidate and the hired worker chooses how much eort to exert in project X and in activity Y . The agent has to follow the principal's instructions and thus cannot take any decision. In the Selection treatment, the agent is not forced to follow the instructions received by the principal. Moreover, the agent has the opportunity to privately suggest to the hired worker a level of eort to exert both in X and Y . Communication renders the agent's intentions clear: the agent's decision to select one of the two candidates may be aimed either at increasing the prot of the organization as a whole or at getting personal benets from the employment relationship. Compared to the Baseline treatment, we observe a signicant increase in the number of low ability candidates hired in the Selection treatment. Moreover, we provide evidence that such a hiring distortion is due to the fact that low ability workers exert more eort in activity Y and less eort in project X than the high ability ones. Agents do strategically exploit the reciprocal concerns of low ability workers who feel less entitled to get the job and thus are more grateful to the agent for being selected. We then examine whether distributing a small fraction of the prots to the workers is eective in limiting the emergence of backscratching reciprocity. The Baseline-Prot sharing and Selection-Prot sharing treatments replicate the design implemented in the corresponding Baseline and Selection treatments with the single dierence that the worker receives a small fraction of the value generated in project X. In the Selection-Prot sharing treatment we nd that distributing a small share of the value of project X to the workers is eective in reducing the low ability workers' eort distortion in favor of agents 2 Some concrete examples of this behavior are provided by The Conict of Interest Board (COIB), New York. In the case No. 2010-035 (2010) COIB v. Fischetti the Senior Deputy Director for Infrastructure Technology in the Information Technology Division at the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) was ned for his multiple violations of the City's conicts of interest law. In particular, "he used his NYCHA subordinate, a Data Technician, to perform work on a regular basis at the restaurant without compensation. He further admitted that he caused his subordinate to use his NYCHA computer, e-mail account, and Blackberry to perform work related to the restaurant, at times the subordinate was required to be working for the City." For further evidence look at the COIB webpage at http://www.nyc.gov/html/conicts/html/topic/position.shtml with respect to the Selection treatment. Moreover, when comparing the Baseline-Prot sharing to the Baseline treatment we nd that workers, irrespectively from their ability, exert signicantly higher eort in project X. Given that the share of the value of project X distributed to the worker is very small, we suggest that such a result is not simply driven by the monetary motive associated with the prot sharing payo structure. It seems rather due to a positive eect on the worker's attitude toward the rm: even the presence of a tiny link between payment and eort is shown to be relevant in shaping the way workers perceive the organization.
Related Literature
There is a vast experimental literature on gift exchange games, initiated by Fehr et al. (1993) and followed by many applications both in the lab (Fehr et al., 1997 , 1998a ,b, Fehr and Falk, 1999 , Charness, 2004 , Eriksson and Villeval, 2012 and in the eld (Gneezy and List, 2006 , Bellemare and Shearer, 2009 , Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010 , Kube et al., 2013 . In the eld, the eectiveness of gift exchange seems to depend on the details of the environment and, in particular, it could be enhanced when targeted toward reciprocal employees (Englmaier and Leider, 2012) . These studies all focus on two-tier settings and test the positive eect of reciprocity in limiting opportunistic behaviors of workers. The novelty of our approach consists in testing the gift exchange hypothesis in three-tier organizations. By mean of an experiment we show that reciprocity may damage hierarchical organizations, when their members use it as an enforcement device to acquire personal illegitimate benets. A second branch of literature related to our paper refers to the distortions in the hiring process due to favouritism within organizations. Several studies have pointed out that organizations' performance is usually negatively aected when candidates' evaluation is not based on their ability (Levine et al., 2010, Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013) . This can happen when candidates are hired or promoted on the basis of subjective rather than objective criteria.
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Managers may indeed favor workers according to their social connections (Bandiera et al., 2009 ) and personal preferences when objective evaluations of workers' performance are not available (Prendergast and Topel, 1993) , or may favor those who engage in ingratiatory behavior regardless of their objective ability (Robin et al., 2014) . With respect to these studies, we look to an additional motivation of the distortion of the hiring process: the attempt to induce reciprocal behavior in less entitled workers by favoring them in the selection, in the hope of receiving future benets. 4 The dark side of reciprocity has already been analyzed by scholars in other disciplines. Studies in Social Psychology underline how recipients of (unsolicited) gifts feel indebted toward the gift givers and are more likely to \return the favour", once requested. These studies show how individuals can trigger reciprocity in order to gain an unfair advantage (Cialdini, 1996) . In Organizational Science backscratching is identied as (vertical) cronyism and indicates a favouritism of the superior toward subordinates (as for example the assignment of promotion, bonus, pay rise, or better job) based on criteria dierent than merit in exchange for the latter's personal loyalty (Khatri and Tsang, 2003) . Reciprocity has also been shown to be a key feature in sustaining corruption agreements, which cannot be enforced by third parties (Abbink et al., 2002 , Abbink, 2004 , Barr and Serra, 2009 ).
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We are not aware of any experimental study looking at the emergence of implicit collusion sustained by reciprocity in hierarchical organizations. In a recent study, Malmendier and Klaus (2017) analyze the emergence of a dark side of reciprocity in a dierent context, a client-producer relationship. They nd that when a decision maker has to buy a product on behalf of a client, and two producers compete to sell the product, the possibility of one producer sending a small gift to the decision maker increases the probability that the recipient chooses the gift-giver's product, even if favoring the gift-giver will damage the client. Compared to Malmendier and Klaus (2017) , there are two main dierences in our design. First, in our experiment workers hired by agents can reciprocate towards them without damaging their principal, and therefore there is not necessarily a tension between reciprocating a gift and fullling a duty. Second, our design allows us to investigate the role of subjective entitlement within organizations. Following Schlicht (1998, p. 24) , we dene entitlements as \subjectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them". In our setting, the low ability candidate is less entitled to be selected for the job compared to the high ability one. The relevance of subjective entitlement has been displayed by recent papers showing that gifts oered by employers to workers who belong to relatively disadvantaged groups and/or to the lower part of the performance distribution are likely to elicit more gratitude 4 Another reason for managers to promote low quality workers is found in the fact that incompetent managers would feel threatened by competent subordinates, and inevitably drive away competent employees (Bedeian and Armenakism, 1998) . In line with this reasoning, Prendergast (1993) notes that \yes men" tend to be concentrated among less able workers and among workers with less able managers.
5 Gneezy et al. (2013) have provided experimental evidence that greed, rather than reciprocity, may explain the emergence of corruption. (Baron, 2013 , Montinari et al., 2016 . Our ndings are in line with Kolm (2006) evidencing how the beneciaries of (unsolicited) gift tend to feel \morally indebted" toward the gift giver. Moreover, our contribution highlights the crucial role of subjective entitlement in activating this feeling. A third branch of literature related to our work analyzes how to reduce the negative eects of internal collusion. Bac (1996) studies how hierarchical structures aect the level of corruption in an organization; Thiele (2013) suggests decreasing the incentives for employees while increasing managers' compensations. Chang and Lai (2002) investigate the impact of social norms on supervisors' corrupt behavior showing that, when in the presence of corruption, paying supervisors more than workers limits workers' slack. We show that reward systems do not only provide monetary incentives but also aect workers' attitudes towards the corporate culture, ultimately aecting their productivity. Using a prot sharing compensation scheme to increase the organizational performance, via positive changes in employees' attitude, has already been suggested (Osterman, 1994 , Knez and Simester, 2001 , Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002 , Heywood et al., 2005 and is a well-known phenomenon in the economics literature (Kerr and Slocum, 1987) .
The Model
The model analyzes a three-tier organization, formed by a Principal (P), an Agent (A), and a worker. The worker is selected from a pool of two candidates, a Low ability worker (L worker) and a High ability worker (H worker). The principal needs a worker to carry out a project but, being unable to distinguish between the ability of the two candidates, he hires an informed agent and pays her a xed compensation to select one of the two candidates. Once selected, the worker receives a xed compensation and chooses how much eort x ! 0 to exert in the project valuable to the principal and how much eort y ! 0 in a dierent activity that benets the agent, with the overall eort resulting from the sum of the two eort components: e = x + y. The (monetary) cost of eort c(e) is a dierentiable, strictly increasing and convex function in the overall amount of eort e exerted by the worker, with c(0) = 0:
The principal's monetary payo is equal to P = ( Inequity aversion is modelled according to the standard Fehr and Schmidt model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) with ; ; and 0 < 1. Individuals who exhibit ORP are heterogeneous with respect to the weight assigned to the reciprocity component. For sake of simplicity, we assume that i P f0; 1g; we then classify individuals with respect to their preferences in: selsh (SP), inequity averse (I-ORP) and reciprocity concerned (R-ORP). We assume that workers' preferences are not correlated with their ability and that every player is SP, I-ORP and R-ORP, respectively, with positive probability.
We consider two dierent games. In both games the principal plays an action s P P fH; Lg that we interpret as the suggestion given to the agent on which worker to hire. In the baseline game the suggestion is binding, the agent is therefore a ctitious player who has no actions to play, and the hired worker t P fH; Lg chooses how much eorts x and y to exert. In the selection game the suggestion is not binding, the agent chooses which worker t P fH; Lg to hire, and the hired worked chooses the pair (x; y) of eorts to exert.
Players' reciprocity depend on their beliefs about the other players' actions. R-ORP worker i P fH; Lg shows reciprocity concerns towards either the principal or the agent, 6 We take as reference the model by Charness and Rabin (2002) . depending on his beliefsŝ P i about which type of worker the principal has suggested to hire. Specically, we assume that i;P =ŝ P i . Similarly, an R-ORP worker believes that the agent was kind with him if he was hired against the principal's suggestion, that is i;A = 1 ŝ P i : An R-ORP agent does not feel any reciprocity towards the principal, while she is grateful to the type of worker who will provide her with the largest monetary payo. Finally, principal's reciprocity towards the worker depends on his beliefs about the amount of eortx t that a worker of ability t P fH; Lg will exert. We assume that P;H = 1 if x H >x L and zero otherwise, and P;L = 1 ifx L >x H and zero otherwise, that is the principal believes that a worker of ability t is kind with him if he exerts strictly more eort than the other worker P fH; Lg ;with T = t:
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We solve both games by backward induction. Consider rst the baseline game. Starting from the last stage, selsh workers exert zero eort both in x and y. Whatever worker i P fH; Lg is hired, i;P = 1, since the principal's suggestion is binding . Given that, by design, the principal is the player with lowest monetary payo (at least when x = y = 0); in equilibrium both I-ORP and R-ORP workers exert a positive amount of eort x and zero eort in y; and the amount of eort exerted by H and L workers, on average, is the same. Principals, irrespective of their preferences, hire H workers because they exert the same eort than L workers but they have higher ability. The following proposition summarizes these ndings. 7 Principal's reciprocity towards the agent is not relevant because the principal cannot aect the agent's payo. Nonetheless, it is natural to assume that the principal is grateful to the agent who hires the worker who exerts the highest eort x:
Consider now the selection game. This game shows a multiplicity of equilibria depending on the principal's suggestion. We focus on the equilibrium in which principals suggest to hire H workers, as in the baseline game, also because it is the unique equilibrium that exists for any possible probability distribution over workers' preferences (in fact, it is easy to check that this is the only equilibrium if all workers are selsh). Starting from the last stage, selsh workers exert zero eort. Consider R-ORP workers. In equilibrium beliefs are correct so H;P = 1 and H;A = 0; while L;P = 0 and L;A = 1. Therefore, H workers with R-ORP exert eort x while L workers with R-ORP exert eort y: Consider now I-ORP workers. Since the worker has always a lower monetary payo than the agent (even when x = y = 0) and the principal has a lower monetary payo than workers if they choose x = y = 0, it follows that in equilibrium I-ORP workers, irrespective of their type t P fH; Lg ; exert zero eort y and a positive amount of eort x:
The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium of the selection game in which principals suggest to hire H workers. In this equilibrium, selsh workers exert zero eort. Inequityaverse workers exert a positive amount of eort x and zero eort y, irrespective of their ability. Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability H exert positive eort x and zero y; while Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability L exert zero eort x and a positive eort y. Selfish and Reciprocity-concerned agents hire L workers, while Inequity-averse agents hire H Finally the last theoretical prediction refers to the hiring of workers.
Prediction 3 The fraction of low ability workers hired in the selection game is larger 8 than the fraction of low ability workers hired in the baseline game.
Up to now we have assumed, as is customary in economics, that preferences are exogenously determined by nature. According to our model, agents with ORP preferences are either inequity averse or reciprocal. However, which component of the ORP preferences, reciprocity or inequity aversion, turns out to be more prominent for an individual could also be inuenced by the environment. To investigate, in an anonymous laboratory setting, whether the features of the working environment aect which one of these two potentially conicting preferences prevails, we consider a modication of the workers' payment. In particular, we introduce a tiny prot sharing compensation scheme that assigns an additional small fraction of the principal's prots to the worker. Let w denote the fraction of the principal's prots distributed to the worker. To avoid the monetary incentives could directly inuence the worker's eort x, we assume that w < c H (0). Nevertheless, we conjecture that other regarding preferences could be inuenced by the type of contract oered to the worker. Namely, a prot sharing contract could render the principal's payo salient to the workers, and therefore could induce all workers with ORP preference to be inequity averse. As a consequence, any dierences between the two games, baseline and selection, should disappear when a prot sharing contract is oered to workers.
Conjecture 1 If a prot sharing contract renders the principal's payo salient to the workers, then Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability H and L exert positive eort x and zero y both in the (prot sharing) baseline and selection games. In particular, workers with ability L should behave the same in the baseline and in the selection game in the presence of a prot sharing contract.
Before concluding this section it is worth emphasizing that our simple model predicts that every worker never simultaneously exerts both eorts, x and y: It is easy to generalize the model to admit that some workers could choose to exert positive eort x and y: Suppose that has a continuous probability distribution with support [0; 1] and U i = i + I P jT =i i i;j j + (1 i )(j j i j) ; with 0 < 1; < 1; and > 1 (to avoid both components to be linear). It is easy to check that in the baseline game all ORP workers exert positive eort x and zero y; because both reciprocity and inequity aversion are addressed towards the principal's payo. In the selection game (focusing on the equilibrium in which principals suggest to hire H workers) H workers, irrespective of their ; still exert zero eort y and positive x; while a L worker i with i P (0; 1) will exert a positive amount of eort x, due to his inequity concern towards the principal, but also a positive amount of eort y; to reciprocate the agent's kindness. Still, the qualitative results of the simple version of the model with P f0; 1g remain unchanged, and, importantly, the above Predictions still hold.
Experimental Design and Parameters
In our experiment we implement a between subjects analysis in a 2x2 design, where we vary either the payo structure of the game and whether the principal or the agent is making the hiring decision, mirroring the games discussed in the theoretical model, with few dierences. In the lab we render an organization composed by a Principal (P), an Agent (A), and a worker, either of Low ability (L worker) or High ability (H worker). The principal hires an informed agent and pays her to select one of the two candidates. The principal gives instructions to the agent about which type of worker t P fH; Lg to hire, either H or L worker, and the agent selects the worker. The selected worker receives a xed compensation by the principal and chooses how much eort to exert in project X and in activity Y . After the worker's decision, payos are determined and the game ends. The non-selected candidate receives an unemployment benet. In the Baseline treatment (BSL) participants play the game just described and the principal gives binding instructions to the agent about which worker to hire: either L or H worker. In the Selection treatment (SEL) players' payos are the same as in the BSL treatment, but the agent i) chooses whether to hire worker L or worker H, since principal's suggestion is not binding anymore;
ii) may suggest to the hired worker a desired eort level to exert in X and Y .
The Baseline Prot sharing (BSL P S ) and Selection Prot sharing (SEL P S ) treatments are identical to the BSL and SEL treatments respectively, with the only exception that we introduce a tiny prot sharing compensation for the workers. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the values assigned to the parameters in each treatment, with 10 ECUs =1 Euro implemented as exchange rate.
In the experiment, we choose ability H = 0:5 > L = 0; 8 the levels of eort exerted in X and Y are integer numbers between f1; 2:::; 10g and f0; 1; :::; 5g respectively, and their sum has to be greater than one and less than or equal to ten. Eort in project X generates an output X = (x + t ) which is aected by a random variable, denoted by , uniformly distributed on the interval [0:8; 1:2] with mean equal to one. The random variable together with the small dierence in ability makes it harder for the principal to infer the ability of the worker hired by the agent, since he only receives information about the value produced in X, which is a noisy signal of both the worker's eort and ability. Eort in activity Y generates an output Y = y, with = 0:4, so that the workers' ability does not aect their performance in activity Y .
Panel B of Table 1 reports the worker i' s payo function: i = m W c(e). m W is the xed compensation that he receives from the principal when being hired, irrespective from his type t P fH; Lg and c(e) is the cost of the total eort exerted by the hired worker (i.e. e = x + y), which is taken from Fehr et al. (1998b) , with the cost of the minimum level of enforceable eort (i.e. x = 1 in project X) being equal to 0. The cost of exerting eort, c(e); is an increasing function of the overall eort and does not depend on whether it is exerted in X and/or in Y . If not hired, the worker receives a xed unemployment benet of 10 ECUs. In the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments a tiny prot sharing compensation scheme for the worker, W = 0:075, is introduced.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the monetary payos for the agent and the principal. The agent's monetary payo is increasing both in the eort exerted by the hired worker in project X and in activity Y : A = A X + y + m A , where m A is a xed compensation paid by the principal. The fraction of the output X assigned to the agent depends on the treatment: while in the BSL and SEL treatments A = 0:15, in the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments it is reduced to A = 0:075, in order not to change the cost of the incentive schemes for the principal. Selsh and R-ORP agents, who believe that all workers are payo maximizers, should choose to select H workers if A is positive. Most importantly, the agent gets the entire amount of the output produced by the worker's eort in activity Y = y and, since > A ! 0, the agent's monetary payo is higher when a given level of eort is exerted in activity Y rather than in project X. This creates a potential conict between the principal's interests (who only benets from eort in project X) and the agent's ones. The agent has also the option to ex-ante refuse the value produced in activity Y , thus devoting it to the organization following the rules adopted to distribute the value produced in X. Note that agents motivated by inequality aversion (I-ORP) might prefer to choose L workers if they believe that, due to the \entitlement eect", L workers will exert more eort than H workers. The agent's possibility to send a suggestion and to Note. In Panels B and C the values are obtained considering a realization of = E() = 1. Panels B and C report 7:5% (15%) of the output, that is, the value produced in project X. The experiment consists of two parts. In the rst part, subjects participate in one of the treatments described above, playing the game as one shot. In the second part, they play the same game for 15 periods, maintaining the same role as in part 1 but under a stranger random matching protocol (see the experimental protocol in the Online Appendix B). In part 2 feedbacks is provided to every participant at the end of each of the 15 periods.
The principal receives information regarding the value produced in X while the agent is informed about the eort exerted in both X and Y in their organization. Finally, all participants are informed about: i) how many H and L workers have been hired in other organizations within the previous period of the session and ii) the average eort exerted in X and Y by H and L workers in other organizations.
Previous research has suggested (Keizer et al., 2008 , Gino et al., 2009 , Diekmann et al., 2015 that others' norms violation aects individual choices: we thus expect that when a \collusive" norm begins to spread among players, i.e., the proportion of agents choosing L worker and/or the proportion of workers exerting eort in Y increases, then the propensity for subjects to pursue their personal interest at the expense of the organization increases, generating a snowball eect (Chang and Lai, 2002) .
Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . In all treatments, participants were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) . 9 We conducted 21 sessions of the BSL, SEL and SEL P S treatments at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Germany), from November 2012 to February 2013. Respectively, 216, 212 and 216 subjects participated in the BSL, SEL and SEL P S treatments. 140 subjects participated in the BSL P S treatment, at the lab of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena in January 2017.
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The experimental procedures, length and average earnings were the same in all treatments.
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More details on the experimental procedures can be found in the Online Appendix B. The duration of each session was about 110 minutes and the average payment was 17 Euros, including a show up and participation fee of 4 Euros.
Experimental results
In this section we present our experimental ndings. First, we analyze the hiring decisions (subsection 5.1). Then, we focus on the eort exerted by the workers in project X and in activity Y (subsections 5.2) and on the agents' intention (subsection 5.3). Throughout the analysis we will focus on the 15 periods of part 2, when information about others' behavior is spread among participants.
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Given that spreading information may render participants' choices in part 2 dependent upon previous periods in the same session, we perform both i) two-sample Mann-Whitney tests and ii) Somers' D median dierence tests (Newson, 2002) , reporting in the main text only i) unless the two tests give dierent results. Result 1. The proportion of L workers hired is higher in the SEL and SEL P S treatments than in the BSL treatment. When hiring L workers, the majority of agents do not comply with the instructions received by the principals.
Support for Result 1 can be found in Figure 1 , which reports the proportion of principals 10 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to run this additional treatment. 11 The experimental laboratories of the Max Planck Institute of Economics and of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena share the same recruiting system and, therefore, the same subject pool. Subjects' invitations for the BSL PS treatment were sent to exactly the same subject pool used in the other treatments, also maintaining the same criteria for the eligibility.
12 Result from Part 1 are qualitatively identical to those of Part 2 and they are reported in the Online Appendix A, section 6. Since 5/54, 8/53, 9/34 and and 10/54 L workers are hired in the BSL, SEL, BSL PS and SEL PS treatments, respectively, the analysis on eort has very little statistical power and would not lead to any additional benet to the reader. 13 When performing the Mann-Whitney test we average the data within a session and treat each session as a single observation. While conservative, this approach makes the power of all tests low and not robust to outliers. To account for these limitations we use the rank order statistics Somers' D (provided by thè somersd' package in Stata) that looks at the individuals' choices accounting for the presence of clusters at the level of sessions in the data. giving instruction to hire L worker and the proportion of agents hiring L worker in part 2. In the BSL treatment 28:30% of the principals hire L workers while this percentage increases to 47:04% when the agents are making the hiring decision in the SEL treatment.
The decision to hire L workers in the BSL treatment may be motivated by the expectation that, feeling less entitled for the position, they will be more grateful than H workers and therefore will exert a higher eort in project X; as a consequence, the productivity loss due to the dierence in ability will be overcompensated, as shown by Montinari et al. (2016). 14 It is important to note that in the SEL treatment, in the majority of the cases, L workers are hired against the principal's suggestion. Specically, this happens in 58:56% (N = 219/374) of the cases.
In the BSL P S treatment principals increase the proportion of L workers hired compared to the BSL treatment (MW test: z=1.91, p=0.06): 15 the prot sharing compensation scheme appears to render more salient for them the possibility that an \entitlement" eect could induce L workers to feel more grateful for being hired. Comparing the SEL and SEL P S treatments, when agents are making the hiring decision, we nd that the tendency to hire more L workers than the ones suggested by the principal is basically unchanged (WSR tests: L suggested vs L hired, SEL z = 1:86, p = 0:06, SEL P S z = 2:29, p = 0:02). As already noted for the SEL treatment, also in the SEL P S treatment if we focus on those agents who hired L workers, we nd that the majority of them did not follow the principal's suggestion (59:95%, N = 220=367). We interpret these results as a distortion in the hiring process, which is not surprising if we consider that in the SEL P S treatment the agents only get A = 0:075 of the value produced in project X, i.e. 50% less than what they got in the SEL treatment, and therefore they have less incentive to hire H workers.
When focusing on the individual hiring decisions, we nd that in the BSL and BSL P S treatments, on average, 52:27% of the principals decides to hire a L worker between 0 to 4 times while only 25:23% of the agents do so in the SEL and SEL P S treatments; on average 42:99% of agents hires L workers 8 or more times. This suggests that the reported dierences between treatments are not driven by the behavior of a minority of agents.
The dynamics of the hiring decision reveals that in the SEL and SEL P S treatments the distortion in hiring emerges from the rst period and persists until the last one: the 
Workers' eort
In the following we concentrate on the eort exerted by the hired workers. Results 2-4 state our main ndings, statistical support is provided afterwards.
Result 2. In the BSL and BSL P S treatment the average level of eort exerted in project X and in activity Y is the same for H and L workers. test, BSL: z = 2:37, p = 0:02; BSL P S : z = 7:67, p = 0:00 WSR test, henceforth).
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In activity Y both workers exert an eort signicantly higher than zero and equals to 0:89 and 0:71 in BSL and BSL P S treatments, respectively, (WSR test, BSL: z = 2:37, p = 0:02; BSL P S : z = 7:67, p = 0:00).
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Result 3. In the SEL treatment workers exert greater eort in activity Y and less eort in project X compared to the BSL treatment. This dierence is driven by the behavior of L workers, who on average increase their eort in activity Y and reduce their eort in project X. Result 4. Prot sharing is eective in limiting backscratching by L workers: dierences in the eort exerted in activity Y are not signicant when comparing the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments.
The prot sharing compensation scheme has quite a strong eect on the eort exerted in project X, despite workers only getting a small fraction W = 0:075 of the value generated in X. We nd that, overall, workers increases their eort in X of about 40% in the BSL P S treatment compared to the BSL treatment, and of about 26% in the SEL P S treatment compared to the SEL treatment. This increase is signicant when considering L and H workers separately, according to a set of MW tests, one-sided: BSL P S vs BSL, x H , z = 2:17, p = 0:03; x L , z = 1:53, p = 0:06. SEL P S vs SEL, y H , z = 1:45, p = 0:07; y L , z = 2:11, p = 0:02. Moreover, we observe that the prot sharing induces a reduction of the eort exerted in Y . When comparing the SEL P S and SEL treatments, we nd that both H and L workers signicantly reduces their eort in Y (MW tests, one-sided: y H , z = 1:60, p = 0:06; y L , z = 2:75, p = 0:01). Consider now Table 2 : it compares the total eort (e = x + y) exerted by the hired workers across the four treatments. The average total eort exerted by the hired workers (irrespective of their ability) is equal to 3:53 and 3:63 in the BSL and SEL treatments and to 4:43 and 3:65 in the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments, respectively. Pairwise comparisons across treatments are not statistically signicant except for the BSL and BSL P S treatments (z = 1:79, p = 0:07). Our results show that, overall, the treatments aect how workers allocate their eort between project X and activity Y , but not the total eort exerted per se. In the SEL treatment, therefore, we interpret the eort exerted in activity Y as an eort distortion while in the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments the prot sharing payment scheme acts by shifting eort from activity Y to project X. Table2. Average total eort (x + y) exerted by the workers, standard deviation in parentheses.
Additional analyses focusing on the frequency of individual eort choices reveal that the observed backscratching is not due to the behavior of a small minority of workers, but it is rather a widespread phenomena, see the Online Appendix A.2.1 for more details. The dynamics of the eort exertion in X and Y reveals that in the SEL backscratching emerges from the rst period and persists until the last one, detailed results are reported in the online Appendix A.2.1. Table 3 allows us to evaluate the impact of the prot sharing incentive scheme on the emergence of backscratching, by performing a dierence in dierences analysis that compares the dierence in eort exertion in project X and in activity Y between the BSL and SEL treatments to the dierence between the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments. The estimations reported are obtained by means of from a set of Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions, which simultaneously estimates two equations (where the dependent variables are the eort exerted by workers in X and Y , respectively) allowing for errors to be correlated. This estimation method allows us to account for the fact that workers simultaneously choose an eort level in X and Y . Standard errors are bootstrapped at the level of session.
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In all models we use as independent variables a set of dummies to identify the Selection treatments (i.e. Selection takes value 1 for the SEL and SEL P S treatments and 0 otherwise) and the prot sharing incentive scheme (i.e. prot sharing takes value 1 for the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments and 0 otherwise). The variable L worker takes value 1 if the worker has low ability and 0 otherwise while hired in t-1 identies whether the worker was hired in the previous period or not. Results of the Breusch-Pagan test of independence conrm that residuals from the two equations are not independent (p < 0:000 in both cases), with a coecient of correlation of the residuals of around 14%. Consider models 1a and 1b: the coecient associated to the variable Selection shows the dierence between the BSL and SEL treatments, as the BSL treatment is the omitted category. In model 1a, the coecient has a negative and signicant eect, while it has a positive and signicant eect in model 1b, conrming our previous ndings: when passing from the BSL to the SEL treatment, we observe a reduction in the eort exerted in X and an increase in the eort exerted in Y , signalling the emergence of backscratching. The coecient associated to the variable Prot sharing represents the dierence between the BSL and the BSL P S treatments, which is positive for the eort exerted in X and negative for the eort exerted in Y .
In models 2a and 2b, we introduce the interaction between the Selection and the Prot sharing treatments. The coecient of the interaction term identies the dierence in differences, that is the dierence in eort exertion between the BSL and SEL treatments vs the dierence in eort exertion between the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments. We observe that this coecient has a negative and signicant eect on the eort exerted both in X and Y , while other eects remain unchanged. Finally, in models 3a and 3b, we introduce the interaction terms between: i) the Selection treatment and L workers; ii) the Prot sharing treatment and L workers, and iii) the Selection treatment, the Prot sharing treatment and L workers. In model 3a, the coecients of Selection and of the interaction between Selection and Prot sharing loose signicance, the rst interaction displays a negative and signicant eect, while the second a positive and signicant eect. No signicant eect is found for the third triple interaction, meaning that there is no additional eect on the exertion of eort in project x that can be explained when considering the behavior of L workers. Other results remain unchanged with respect to model 2a.
When considering model 3b, we nd that our main results from model 2b remain unchanged.
In addition, the interaction between the Selection treatment and L workers, and the in-teraction between the Selection treatment, the Prot sharing treatment and L workers display a negative and signicant eect: when considering the exertion of eort in Y , we observe a dierence in dierences between the BSL vs SEL treatment and the BSL P S vs SEL P S treatment, plus an additional eect related to the behavior of L workers.
Our results based on the dierence in dierences analysis conrm that the prot sharing incentive is eective in limiting the emergence of backscratching by L workers (linear combination of coecients: :419, p = 0:070): despite the agents still hiring a high fraction of L workers in the attempt to engage in a backscratching relationship, the selected L workers signicantly reduce their reciprocal response toward them, shifting their eort exertion from activity Y to project X. Most importantly, these results indicate that reward systems do not only provide monetary incentives but they may also aect workers' attitudes towards the organization: the small incentive provided to workers is not enough to change their behavior because of a merely pecuniary motive.
The agents' intentions
In this section we investigate the agents' intentions by looking i) at the eort suggestions to the hired worker and ii) at their decision to refuse the eort exerted in activity Y. Moreover, we report the results of a robustness treatment, identied as control-Selection (cSEL), aimed at testing the role of the agent's suggestion in shaping backscratching reciprocity. Result 5 summarizes our ndings.
Result 5. On average agents suggest exerting more eort in activity Y and less eort in project X to L workers compared to H workers. Agents who hire L workers following the instructions of the principal suggest on average higher eort in X compared to agents who hire L workers against the principal's instructions. Agents who select L workers are more likely to accept what was produced in Y in the SEL treatment than in the BSL treatment.
Support for Result 5 can be found in Table 4 and 5. Table 4 reports, for the SEL and SEL P S treatments, the average eort suggested by the agents in project X and in activity Y , depending on the ability of the selected worker. It can be noted that in the dierent treatments agents try to engage in a backscratching relationship in dierent ways: in the SEL treatment they suggest to L workers to exert more eort in Y compared to H workers; in the SEL P S treatment they suggest to L workers to exert less eort in X compared to H workers. Our results thus show that both the eort suggestion to workers and the possibility to ex-ante refuse the value produced in Y are important features of our design in making the agents' intentions clear: agents who select L workers act in this way to maximize their own monetary payo. However, compared to the BSL treatment, in the SEL treatment two features of the experimental design changed: 1) the possibility for the agent not to follow the principal's suggestion and 2) the possibility to suggest to the hired worker a desired eort level. In our robustness treatment cSEL we replicated the SEL treatment with the only exception that the agent cannot make any suggestion to the hired worker about how much eort to exert in X and Y . When considering both the agents' hiring behavior and the workers' 
Conicts of interest and earnings
In this section we focus on how the distortions on workers' eort and agents' selection aect the monetary payos of each member of the organization and the total earnings achieved by the organization. Our main ndings are summarized in result 6. In the Online Appendix A.5 we provide further analysis.
Result 6. A prot sharing compensation scheme increases the earnings of the principals in both the BSL P S and the SEL P S treatments compared to the BSL and SEL treatments, respectively. It decreases the earnings of the agents in the SEL P S compared to the SEL treatment, displaying its eectiveness in limiting backscratching. As regards the total earnings, the maximum amount is reached in the BSL P S treatment, while the minimum amount is obtained in the SEL treatment. Support for Result 6 is provided in Figure 3 . With respect to the BSL treatment, the distortions in the hiring process and in the eort exertion in the SEL treatment result in a signicant increase of the agent's earnings and a reduction of the principal's earnings (MW tests BSL vs SEL, z=1:98, p=0:03; agent, z=2:24, p=0:02) . When comparing the SEL and the SEL P S treatments we observe that, once the prot sharing is introduced, the principal's earnings increase while the earnings of the agents decrease (MW test SEL vs SEL P S : principal, z=1:98, p=0:03; agent z=3:13, p=0:00). In particular, in the SEL treatment, hiring a L worker rather than a H worker is benecial for the agents, providing them with higher earnings, while this is not the case in the SEL P S treatment (MW test one-sided H vs L: SEL z = 1:60, p = 0:06; SEL P S z = 0:45, p = 0:33). The opposite eect is observed when considering the principal's earnings (MW test one-sided H vs L: SEL z = 1:47, p = 0:07; SEL P S z = 1:09, p = 0:14).
When considering the total earnings of the organization, obtained as the sum of the monetary payo of all its members, they decrease by about 2% in the SEL treatment with respect to the BSL treatment. In the SEL P S treatment total earnings increase since the prot sharing aects L workers' behavior: they substantially increase their eort in X and reduce their eort in Y, compared to the SEL treatment. In the BSL P S treatment, all workers exert more eort than in the BSL treatment in project X, which is benecial for the organization: the largest amount of total earning is obtained in absence of backscratching reciprocity.
Note that, in our design, exerting eort in activity Y would increase total earnings compared to not exerting any eort at all. However, this does not seem to occur in our experiment where, as shown in Table 2 , the treatment manipulations aected the eort allocation between X and Y rather than the total eort exerted.
To get an idea of the distortion associated to backscratching, we can calculate the hypothetical earnings across all parties, i.e. the total earnings obtained if the all the eort would have been exerted in X. The hypothetical earnings would have been equal to 135:48 and 136:26 in the BSL and SEL treatments and to 144:96 and 137:95 in the BSL P S and SEL P S treatments, respectively. By comparing the hypothetical and actual earnings across all parties we can get a measure of the loss in the total earnings of the organization, which is equal to 5:1, 8:17, 6:93 and 6:56 ECU`s in the BSL, SEL, BSL P S and SEL P S treatment, respectively. It can be noted how the losses in the total earnings are the highest in the absence of prot sharing and, in particular, in the SEL treatment, providing additional evidence of the distortion induced by backscratching.
Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that workers' reciprocity concerns may exacerbate, rather than alleviate, conicts of interest within a hierarchical organization. We nd that agents are more likely to hire low ability workers than high ability ones, since they are more likely to exert eort in an activity beneting the agent rather than the principal. The organizational performance is negatively aected by the emergence of hidden gaming, because of the hiring and eort distortions observed in our main treatment. We show that a tiny prot sharing compensation scheme, which may foster workers' identication with the organization, is eective in reducing workers' inecient eort exertion in favor of their foremen. This result is in line with the social psychology literature (Haslam, 2004) and more recent studies in economics Kranton, 2005, 2008) suggesting that workers' eort also depends on how they view themselves in relation to the organization. Interestingly, sharing part of the prots with the agents is not enough to modify their selsh behavior, while extending this compensation scheme to workers signicantly reduces their distorted reciprocity towards agents: other-regarding preferences seem to be more susceptible than self-regarding ones to external stimuli induced by dierent institutional and organizational frameworks. In our experiment, workers' subjective entitlements are based on their dierent abilities: low ability workers, who do not expect to be hired, are more grateful toward their agents compared to the high ability ones. However, other individuals' observable characteristics could possibly be used to induce the emergence of backscratching reciprocity. For example, the decision to hire a candidate identiable as a member of a discriminated group might be used to make him/her feel (more) indebted towards the agent. Alternatively, agents may favor members of their own social group expecting that the reduced social distance strengthens their reciprocity, as in Bramoull e and Goyal (2016). Compared to the gift exchange literature, we extend the hierarchical structure of the organization by adding an intermediate level: we focus our attention on how workers' reciprocity toward the agent aects the organization. However, in the present study, we do not allow the principals to act kindly toward the agent or toward the worker, leaving room for future research to study the eects of multiple and simultaneous exchanges of gifts among the dierent levels of the hierarchy.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward to note that selsh workers exert zero eort. Consider any RORP worker i: For both t P fH; Lg ; worker i is grateful to the principal, then t i;P = 1 and : Finally, selsh and RORP agents choose L workers, because only low ability workers exert eort with positive probability; IORP agents choose to hire L workers only if c H ()
